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Reviewing Stand

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Are We Losing the Cold War in Asia?

A radio discussion over WGN and the Mutual Broadcasting System

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Are We Losing the Cold War in Asia?

MR. MCBURNEY: Are we losing the cold war in Asia?

MR. FIELDING: Yes, definitely, as of this moment. The setback in China has given tremendous impetus to Communist movements throughout Southeast Asia and the Hindu Pakistan sub-continent, and unless the West takes a positive stand soon, its prospects of prevailing ultimately will have been irreparably damaged.

MR. MARQUARDT: I think the evidence is clear that we *are* losing the cold war in Asia. But I also think that the tide can be reversed.

MR. MCGOVERN: Yes, we are losing the cold war—but it is not yet lost—and the situation can be remedied if we adopt a more realistic foreign policy towards the Asiatic continent.

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MR. MCBURNEY: Last week The Reviewing Stand analyzed *The Cold War in Europe*. We agreed that our situation in Western Europe is greatly improved thanks to the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact.

Asia remains the big question. Our speakers today are far from optimistic about Asia.

Captain Fielding has just said rather flatly that we are losing the cold war in Asia. Why do you believe that, Fielding?

'Loss of China'

MR. FIELDING: Well, McBurney, the loss of China is having very serious repercussions throughout Southeast Asia. These Southeast Asian countries like Burma, and Malaya and Siam, French Indo-China and Indonesia are shot through with Communism. As a matter of fact, in the latter two countries liberation movements have been so heavily infiltrated by Communists that it is almost impossible to tell where a genuine aspiration for independence stops and where Communism begins.

The same thing is true of certain

parts of India, and unless we of the West recognize this fact and do something about it in a hurry, we are going to continue to lose this cold war with uncalculable consequences to our long-run prospects, not only to the cold war but the hot war as well.

MR. MARQUARDT: I would agree that the loss of China is a very substantial one to the Western democratic cause. It is significant, I believe, that today in Moscow, the Soviet newspapers proclaim that the announcement of a Communist government in Peiping yesterday was just as important in their "struggle for peace"—which, of course, means the Soviet struggle to dominate the world—was just as important in that struggle as the announcement that Russia had the atomic bomb.

MR. MCGOVERN: I agree on that point. The loss of China was a very severe blow. It has undone the work of the last fifty years in American policy in the Far East, which was based upon the Open Door in China.

'U.S. Need for Bases'

On the other hand, I am not perhaps quite as pessimistic. China is almost lost, but not completely lost. Actually the loss of China is not very serious from the economic point of view—in terms of what we import from and export to China. The most important thing is the influence upon the other nations. What will be the attitude of Japan, of the Philippines, Southeast Asia and Hindu Pakistan?

MR. FIELDING: Now that you brought up the question of the Philippines and Japan, don't you think that the value of Japan and the Philippines as bases, as out-bases in the Pacific has been very seriously undermined by the out-flanking possibilities of a Communist China?

MR. MARQUARDT: If we are considering this strictly from the military standpoint, any attack launched against the

United States from Asia would have to come out of the great ports of Asia; a bomber line established on Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines could dominate those ports and destroy any invasion port before it got started. I wish very quickly to add, however, that I feel that Japan and the Philippines are important to us for reasons other than and in addition to the military reasons.

Is Asia Vital?

MR. MCBURNEY: Before we go on with this analysis of your positions, there are two assumptions which appear to run through this discussion, and I am anxious to explore them just a bit. First, that Asia is vital to American interests. Why is this the case? Why risk American men and money in this area?

MR. MCGOVERN: I think on that point, McBurney, we do have to realize that Asia is certainly one of the most important areas in the world, if only for the reason that half the world's population is there. And with half the world's population cooped up in one small area, it is bound to have vital effects.

Also Asia possesses many of the strategic and vital raw materials of the world. The loss of Asia or the access of Asia will mean a very serious loss to the American economy.

MR. FIELDING: I think the importance of Asia can best be understood if we consider two hard facts: First, this cold war is a global thing. Like a shooting war, it can only be won on a global basis. Second, this cold war has about it all the elements of finality and decisiveness of a hot war. Now in certain conceivable circumstances Russia could actually win the hot war without firing a shot.

MR. MCBURNEY: That suggests the second assumption I want to ask you about, Fielding. Here it is in the words of a West Coast listener to last week's program. She says this: "Your discussion of the cold war took account of nothing but power politics,

bombs and bases and military aid to Europe—not a word about the United Nations or any other plan for working out long-run cooperation."

Here's another letter: "Your cold war discussion is a beautiful example of the kind of propaganda which got us into World War I and World War II." What do you say to that, Fielding?

MR. FIELDING: Well, the approach to the whole question of power politics is not a very pleasant one, but that doesn't alter the fact that we are back in power politics whether we like it or not. The fact remains that the United Nations has not worked as it should have worked, and the reason for that is that we are imposing responsibilities on the United Nations for which it was never created. The United Nations' function originally was to enforce a peace agreed upon by the major powers. No peace has been agreed upon by the major powers. And no peace can be agreed upon by the major powers so long as there is a veto which the Russians use to further their own designs. They don't want peace at the present time.

What of Power Politics?

MR. MARQUARDT: Fielding, I would agree that the cold war involves us in power politics; whether we like them or not, we are in them.

I also believe there is more to power politics than merely the military phase. I believe we will find, for instance, Japan is a much better friend of ours because we have done such things as divided up the land, given the women the vote, and generally improved the democratic processes of Japan. I am sure the Philippines are going to be on our side if a shooting war starts, as much for the reason that we have supported them and helped them rebuild their economy as for the fact that we have bombers based on Clarke Field. I could go right along with the rest of the countries of Asia in this respect.

MR. MCGOVERN: Marquardt, may I

agree with you and develop that theory a little bit further. This is not merely a power politics situation: It is an ideological situation where the world is divided into two great camps—and their friends and their enemies—and we are of the ideology of those which are prodemocratic. At the present time we do have Japan and the Philippines on the democratic team. And there are those that are antidemocratic and totalitarian.

Ideological Aspects

MR. FIELDING: It is perfectly true, McGovern, that the ideological aspect enters into the picture, but in order to understand why one cannot divorce power politics from ideology, you have to understand the nature of the Russian assault against the democratic position in the cold war.

Like ourselves in trying to sell democracy, the Russians are trying to sell Communism. That is the ideological aspect of the cold war. But, in addition to that, they supplement their purely ideological assault by campaigns of physical pressure . . . this is where the power politics comes in . . . supplement this ideological assault by campaigns of physical pressure in the so-called strategic areas of the world, which represent vital military bases that we and our allies would have to control to win another shooting war.

Now, if the Russians are successful in robbing us of these military bases in advance of the shooting, then you will see there won't be any good for us to even attempt shooting, if later on we find we haven't got the bases to bring our military weight to bear against Soviet Russia.

MR. MARQUARDT: I quite agree with you, Fielding, that these bases are essential.

I think the only possible difference—and I am not even sure there is such a difference—would be that I feel we can hold these bases much better by convincing the people of those countries that the democratic processes and

principles do work, that the economy which we can build there will be stronger than the Communist economy, and that they will be much better off on our side of the fence.

MR. FIELDING: Marquardt, let me ask you just one question. Do you believe in the principles of the Truman Doctrine as applied to Europe and Greece?

MR. MARQUARDT: I believe they have been successful in Greece and in Turkey, yes.

MR. FIELDING: All right, there you have nothing more than a manifestation of power politics, because the Truman Doctrine concept is a purely military concept in which we pose physical power against Russian power when we encounter it in these strategic bases.

MR. MARQUARDT: Yes, but let me make this one point on Greece. We had there a country which was friendly to our way of thinking. We had a government that was friendly. And we had people who, war weary as they were, destroyed as their cities were, were willing to stand up and fight for these things that they believed in. Had there been 80 per cent of the Greeks unwilling to fight, despondent like the 80 per cent of the Chinese were, then nothing we could have done in Greece would have saved it.

Complex Situations Involved

MR. MCGOVERN: May I get back to Asia. Any war—whether it is a cold war or hot war—is not won merely by the number of guns and tanks you have; it is the combination of the military situation, the economic situation, the political situation and the psychological.

In trying to estimate the enemy situation, what they can do and can't do, you have to find out what their morale is, how far they are with you and how far they are against you.

MR. MARQUARDT: That's quite right.

MR. FIELDING: I quite agree with you, that you have to prepare the minds of the people in these countries you want

to save, and I agree that the only way to do that is to pursue our attempts to sell democracy to these people. But the fact remains that even if the Greeks had not been willing to fight for us, could we have afforded to give up Greece which is the key to the Eastern Mediterranean? No, we could not have. If the Greeks had not been willing to fight for us, we would have had to fight ourselves.

MR. MARQUARDT: Do you believe we could have sent in an army of American soldiers—not advisers, but the whole works, from supply right on up to the front line—and driven the Communists out of Greece, with, say ten or fifteen divisions of the American troops? Do you think the Congress of the United States or the people of the United States would have stood for that at the time Truman proclaimed his doctrine?

'Is Force the Answer?'

MR. FIELDING: Of course they wouldn't have stood for it. But that doesn't alter the fact that if the alternative was to let Russia get Greece, get control of the Eastern Mediterranean, we would have had no alternative but to do that. We didn't want to send our troops to Europe in the last war, but we had to because these are situations forced upon us by the pressure of events.

MR. MARQUARDT: Captain Fielding, do you believe, then, that the answer in China is to apply power and force ourselves, to send troops into China and drive the Communists out of China with our own men, our own planes?

MR. FIELDING: At the time the Kuomintang armies collapsed on the Yangtze River, the only way we could have salvaged China, stopped it from going Communist, would have been to send American troops into the Yangtze province. None other than General Wedemeyer suggested that very thing when he came back from China. And his proposals were turned down for the very reasons you brought out: The American people, because

they could not perhaps understand the full import of this issue, wouldn't stand for it. But that doesn't alter the fact that that was the only way to salvage China and prevent it going Communist.

'Lack Asiatic Policy'

MR. MCGOVERN: May I bring out the point that, especially in Asia, we have simply lacked a policy. We have never made up our minds what we would or would not do, what we could and could not do. I blame our State Department; I blame the American people for this—because of the fact that we have been oriented so much toward Europe. We understood in general the nature of the importance of keeping an Open Door policy in Western Europe. We had not understood the situation in the Far East. There were many people inside the State Department who felt that the Communists in China were not Communists, therefore, why bother. The real significance they haven't realized—that the loss of China will have an enormous effect on the other portions of Asia.

The real thing we have got to do... it is too late to try to get back China—I think we could have had it... is to make up our minds what shall be our policy for the rest of Asia.

MR. MCBURNEY: What should be our policy in China, McGovern? Do you think we ought to recognize Communist China?

MR. MCGOVERN: No, I do not. I think we have got to be realistic and hard boiled in this matter.

MR. MCBURNEY: That is an immediate issue.

'Need Listening Posts'

MR. MCGOVERN: It is not merely refusing recognition. In other words, deal with them on a realistic basis, but realize that Communist China is Communist in the same way that Poland or Rumania is, that any recognition that we may give must be on a *de facto* basis and must have an adequate *quid pro quo* for each and every-

thing. But even recognition is not going to get us back any trade that is behind the Iron Curtain.

MR. MARQUARDT: I would say regarding recognition of the Communist government, that Mao will not settle for *de facto* recognition. If we do not recognize a Communist government, not immediately, but say in the next six months or a year, our counsels are going to be thrown out of China, our business men are not going to stay there, and our newspapermen will not be there, and we are going to lose complete contact with Communist China. I don't believe that would be advisable or in the best interests of the United States.

But I do agree that hard-headed bargaining with Mao Tse-tung, attempting to get a *quid pro quo* on every exchange with him, would be to our benefit.

MR. FIELDING: I am inclined to agree with you, Marquardt. I think what we need in Communist China are listening posts, and the only way we are going to be able to get listening posts in China is by recognizing China. It seems to me that the disadvantages of recognizing China are far outweighed by the advantages. After all, we recognize Russia, why shouldn't we recognize China?

Comparison With Yugoslavia

MR. MCGOVERN: That is the point I am going to bring out. I have no objection to recognition, but don't think recognition is going to restore friendly relations or enable us to do much. We recognize Russia, we recognize Hungary, we recognize Rumania. What good does that do us? Once you are behind the Iron Curtain you are behind the Iron Curtain.

MR. MARQUARDT: May I make this exception: We recognized Yugoslavia, and it seems to be working out to our advantage. I would not be naive enough to say that Mao Tse-tung might become a Chinese Tito, although the possibility is there. But certainly a complete withdrawal from China

would close the door permanently.

MR. FIELDING: I am not so sure that our aid to Tito is going to pan out as so many people think it might. I think it is a good calculated risk for propaganda purposes, but if anybody thinks we are going to win Tito into democracy by our economic aid, I think he is barking up the wrong tree.

'Still Hope For China?'

MR. MCGOVERN: To get back to China for just a moment. There is one point, I think, that has not been brought out. It has been proven that the Nationalist government of Kuomintang China has been overwhelmingly licked, but the situation is not quite as clear as that would indicate. Actually the Communists still control about half of China. It is unlikely they will control all of China for several years. And, as a matter of fact, the more the Communists win in China, the more unpopular they become with the people, and that is a factor we can utilize.

I do want to have listening posts. I think there may well be a resurrection of a democratic China which we can aid.

MR. MARQUARDT: Yes, McGovern, I think we agree on that point. I am glad you brought up this fact, that half of China still isn't Communist, although it may well go Communist in the near future. Szechwan Province, Formosa and other places in the Southwest and Northwest probably could be held for some time, and I believe eventually there will arise anti-Communist leaders who can be supported and who will have the support of the Chinese people as the Generalissimo does not now have that support.

MR. FIELDING: Analyzing the pattern of the imposition of Communism on countries which come under Russian domination, it is a fact that once the totalitarian police system is imposed on a country, any opposition that might develop in that country is immediately strangled, because it is made impossible for it to organize. Now you are going to get opposition. You un-

doubtedly have opposition in Russia. I know you have opposition in Yugoslavia—even to Tito. But opposition is not permitted to organize, and disorganized opposition remains impotent opposition. In other words, once a country is dragged under the Iron Curtain, opposition on the part of the people themselves can never get them out.

MR. MCGOVERN: There is no doubt that the Communist Party in China and elsewhere have their Gestapos, their secret police, and their thought control. On the other hand, the Communist government is not likely to be as efficient as in some of the other countries. There is a greater chance.

Japan and Philippines

MR. MCBURNEY: Let's talk about Japan, the Philippines and these Pacific island bases for a few minutes. Marquardt seems to be reasonably optimistic about our position there.

MR. MARQUARDT: If we have a showcase in Asia, it certainly is the Philippines. For fifty years we have been building a democracy there, and in 1946 we gave the Filipinos their independence. They were horribly wrecked by the war. Manila was battered worse even than Warsaw. But today they are on the way back. We have supported them, and I think we should continue to support them.

The experiment in Japan has been a tremendous one, but I think on the whole it has been successful. Here are two countries where we can place very sizeable bets in our struggle to confine Communism in Asia.

MR. MCGOVERN: I thoroughly agree with you. At the present time the vast bulk of the people in Japan and the Philippines, and I may add in Formosa, are strongly pro-American. The only thing is we want to see that we don't let them down. At least 75 or 80 per cent of the Japanese are with us, and would like to remain with us for an indefinite period. The only thing is, they are scared as to whether we will or will not take a strong position,

or whether we are going to pull out in Asia. And if they once think we are going to pull out of Eastern Asia they will get on the bandwagon.

Importance of India

MR. FIELDING: I will admit that the Philippines and Japan are excellent bases . . . I come back to bases again. But I think that their value dwindles as they become surrounded or outflanked by Communism. I think eventually we are going to be pushed back into Southeast Asia, and when Southeast Asia goes Red—as I feel it is going to in time—we will then be pushed back on the Hindu Pakistan subcontinent which will remain our final and probably most effective base in the event the present situation ever deteriorates.

MR. MCBURNEY: What is this Hindu Pakistan subcontinent?

MR. FIELDING: It is really what used to be India—although the term India doesn't mean what it meant in pre-partition days. Moslem Pakistan and Hindu India must be distinguished. Hindu India is known as India, but it is really only a part of what used to be India. So in order to designate the entire area, you can't merely talk of India, you have to talk about the Hindu Pakistan subcontinent.

MR. MCBURNEY: You continue to emphasize the importance of that area in our position in Asia, Fielding. What is your line of argument?

'Bases In Near East'

MR. FIELDING: To set up my point let me quote a statement made by General Franz Halder who is probably one of the best recognized strategists in the world today. He was the chief of the German general staff in the first three years of the late war. Discussing the West's prospects against Russia in both a cold war and a hot war, Halder pointed out very aptly a few weeks ago that inasmuch as Russia's military and industrial concentrations were in the Urals and Central Asia, the only decisive strokes that could be

launched against Russia's vitals would have to come from bases in the Far East and the Middle East, and not from Europe.

MR. MCBURNEY: Do you accept that analysis, McGovern?

MR. MCGOVERN: With some modification. Actually the Far East in this connection, meaning Japan, China, Korea, is not a good base from which to launch an attack against Russia. The finest base from which to launch an attack—if it does come to a shooting war, and it may well—would be I say in the Near East, from Arabia and the Iranian flat on Persia. I admit Pakistan is a key place between India and the Near East.

MR. FIELDING: If your contention is valid, that the decisive strokes will have to come from the Middle East, let me say this: that the Hindu Pakistan subcontinent is a southern flank guard to the entire Middle East. If we were to lose the Hindu Pakistan subcontinent, then the chances are we would have a very difficult time hanging on to the Middle East.

'Decision By People'

MR. MARQUARDT: I think that peoples are the important thing, that they are the decisive thing. Geography is, of course, important, but in the long run it is the peoples who make the final decisions, for this reason: The Japanese people who at one time were strong enough to overrun all of Asia have demonstrated their ability and their know-how far more than the peoples of India or Pakistan. The peoples of the Philippines have shown they know more about democracy than any other people out there. That is why I believe our major bets should be based on those two countries.

MR. MCGOVERN: I agree with both of you. In other words, we talk about outflanking. We don't want to give up either flank. We want to keep Japan and Formosa on one side, and we want to keep the Hindu Pakistan base on the other side. Don't give up either one.

MR. FIELDING: That's right. This cold war, in other words, is a global war.

I agree with you that you have got to get the minds of these people into the democratic camp, because it is upon them that we will finally have to depend to hold the military bastion against the approach of Communism.

MR. MARQUARDT: That's right.

England's Policy

MR. MCBURNEY: Do you men expect that we are going to get any substantial aid in Asia from England and other Western European countries?

MR. MARQUARDT: I don't believe so. I believe that although Britain is getting a considerable number of dollars out of Malaya, that the British are not strong enough to be able to support in any great measure a military undertaking in that part of the world. However, they are going to hold Hong Kong, and I think it would be to our advantage to help them do so.

MR. MCBURNEY: Then, in conclusion, what do you men recommend for policy in Asia?

MR. FIELDING: I think that American policy in Asia has to run along the same lines as it has run in Europe. If we recognize the fact that this war is a global war, then the principles that have worked for us in Europe will work for us in Asia. In other words, a sort of an extension of the Marshall Plan principle, perhaps greatly modified to Asia, as well as the Truman Doctrine.

MR. MCBURNEY: Where do you stand Marquardt?

Policy for U.S.

MR. MARQUARDT: I would say specifically, that in Asia we should first of all make an early peace treaty with Japan. Secondly we should continue the support of the Philippines as the major democratic bastion in the Far East. Third, we should encourage a healthy nationalism wherever we can find it. And finally we should support the Pacific pact which Quirino has

suggested for Eastern Asia.

MR. MCGOVERN: First of all we have to start with a recognition of the importance of Asia both by the people and the State Department. Second, we have to have as a result of this recognition a formulation of a definite policy. Any policy is better than no policy, and we at the present time have no Asiatic policy.

And the policy I would advocate is an Open Door policy for the whole of Eastern Asia — special privilege for none, equal opportunity for all and the territorial integrity of Eastern Asia.

And the way to do that . . . I agree with Fielding . . . is a kind of Marshall-Truman Doctrine, plus a Pacific pact built up of a series of strong national governments with strong ideological ties to the democratic world.

MR. MCBURNEY: Are you all agreed on the principle of a Pacific pact?

MR. MARQUARDT: I think it might be interesting to point out that as originally conceived when Chiang-Kai-shek went to Baguio to talk to Quirino they spoke of a military pact, and they undoubtedly were thinking in military terms. That was true when the Generalissimo went up to talk to Syngman Rhee in Korea. Since then, however, Quirino in his letter of instructions to Romulo has pointed out that what he wants at the beginning at least is an economic and cultural association of nations of East Asia. And I think that all of those people are racially

akin, that they do have much in common, that a pact here could be the beginning of a grouping which we could then support as a very effective bulwark against the onrush of Communism.

MR. FIELDING: I admit the first step undoubtedly will be along economic lines just as it was in Western Europe, but eventually—let's be realistic about this thing—if we are going to build a Pacific pact there will have to be force back of it, and we will have to do in the Pacific precisely what we did in Western Europe.

MR. MCGOVERN: And that, as a matter of fact, is what Quirino and these other people want. It was only when we refused to give military aid that they withdrew.

MR. MARQUARDT: That's true, and I think we are agreed in the long run on a grouping there and an association of free peoples whom we can support who will stop Communism.

MR. FIELDING: And who will support us.

MR. MARQUARDT: That is even more important!

MR. MCBURNEY: Yes, the cold war in Asia apparently is a fact, whether we like it or not. Our speakers today believe we must strengthen our position in Asia as we have done in Europe if we hope to find the means of bargaining with Russia.

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DALLIN, DAVID JULIEVICH. *The Rise of Asia in Russia*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949.

Russia's Asiatic policies from the middle of the nineteenth century through 1931.

DALLIN, DAVID JULIEVICH. *Soviet Russia and the Far East*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948.

Survey of Soviet policy in China, Japan and Korea, 1931-1947.

FAIRBANK, JOHN KING. *The United States and China*. (American Foreign Policy Library), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948.

An analysis of Chinese society, culture and politics and of America's concern with them.

LATTIMORE, OWEN. *Situation in Asia*. (Atlantic Monthly Press Book), Boston, Little, 1949.

Maintains that the West can no longer control events in the Far East.

United States Department of State. Office of Public Affairs. Divisions of Publications. "United States Relations with China: with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49." Washington, D.C., Supt. of Doc., 1949.

The now famous "White Paper."

Current History ns 16:221-5, Ap., '49. "America in the Far East." C. L. THOMPSON.

Past policy compared with that of the present and future. Concludes that American expansion and interference in the Far East has been a mistake from the beginning.

Current History ns 17:1-6, Jl., '49. "Wanted: A New China Policy! China in 1926 and Now." H. ABEND and F. L. MAYER.

Tells why the victory of the Communist armies in China does not imply an all out victory for Stalin.

Fortnightly 172 (ns 166): 20-6, Jl., '49. "China under Communism." O. M. GREEN.

An explanation of why the Communists have been so successful in China. *Life* 26:114-20+, Je. 6, '49. "Chaos in Asia." M. WAYS.

Describes the ways in which Asia is heading toward chaos, and ultimately toward a "new order" under the Communists.

Life 27:36-7, Jl. 11, '49. "Last Call for China." C. L. CHENNAULT.

General Chennault asserts that future, effective resistance in China is possible in that third of the nation which still remains outside the Iron Curtain. *Nation* 168:5-8, Ja., '49. "Toward a New China Policy." J. K. FAIRBANK.

Maintains that final victory in China will go to the side that can successfully align itself with the needs of the Chinese masses.

Nation 169:223-6, Sep. 3, '49. "Our Failure in China." OWEN LATTIMORE. A critique of the State Department White Paper.

Nation 168:554-6, My. 14, '49. "Could Japan Go Communist?" W. COSTELLO. Points out the possibility that expanded trade with China, without which

Japan cannot live, may strengthen the Japanese Communist party by a process of slow infiltration.

New Republic 120:5-7, My. 30, '49. "Time to Leave Japan."

Declares that American policy today is directed toward setting up Japan as a reactionary outpost in preparation for an inevitable conflict with Russia.

New Republic 121:11-13, Ag. 22, '49. "America and the Chinese Revolution."
J. K. FAIRBANK.

Maintains that America should forestall the Russian drive toward power in Asia less by containment than by competition.

New York Times Magazine p. 7+, My. 1, '49. "Asia: Spiritual Challenge to Us." N. PEFFER.

An explanation of why America's present policy has won, and will continue to win, nothing but antagonism in the Far East.

Virginia Quarterly Review 25, No. 3:348-64, (Jl.) '49. "Problem of Our Policy in China." M. J. LEVY.

Concludes that the United States can help China industrialize and keep her as an ally, even with a Communist government in power.

Yale Review 39:22-38, Autumn '49. "Chinese Communism: Epoch or Episode."
NATHANIEL PEFFER.

Declares that the success of the Chinese Communists will depend on whether or not they can establish a regime which is Chinese, which is in accord with Chinese genius and which however new its social principles may be, is not "pidgin Russian."



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